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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE, a
Utah body politic and corporate,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

16274

BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN AND COMPANY.
Defendant-Appellant,
vs.
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al.,
Third-Party
Defendants-Respondents.

------- - - - - - - - - - - -

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN AND COMPANY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Utah State University (hereinafter the "University"), claiming that it does not wish to burden the Court
with a separate statement of facts on the issue of liability
and further stating that its Motion for Partial Summary Judgrnent is not dependent upon the acceptance of one or another
version of the facts, nevertheless recites in its brief a 13
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page version of facts it asserts are contrary to the statement of facts which appears in the main brief of appellant
Bosworth, Sullivan & Company (hereinafter "Bosworth").
The statement of facts in the Bosworth brief is supported by the record and on this appeal must be accepted as
true for the purposes of ascertaining the propriety of granting the University's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Therefore, it must be accepted as true that Bosworth's
execution of securities orders was at the request of the
University's investment officer, Donald A.

Catron, and that

Bosworth executed such securities solely as agent and pursuant to a corporate resolution duly passed by the Institutional Counsel authorizing Catron, the University's agent
"to purchase, trade and sell

long or short, transfer and

assign, stocks, bonds and securities of every nature on
margin or otherwise."

The University now seeks restitution

of monies paid to Bosworth for stocks purchased pursuant to
such authorization.
It is the University's position that the purchase of
securities by the University, through Bosworth as its agent,
was ultra

vir:_e~

and, therefore, the University is entitled

to return all of the monies paid for such securities.
The University states that it seeks only to have this
court determine whether the brokers or the taxpayers should
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bear the loss from these transactions.

What the University

actually seeks is equitable relief from its own acts, and to
punish an innocent party because of its reliance upon resolutions of authorized government agencies.

Fundamental fair-

ness compels reversal of the judgment of the court below.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
BOSWORTH IS LIABLE TO THE UNIVERSITY.
At page 15 of its brief, the University states that
the decision in First Equity Corporation of Florida v.
Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), disposes
of most arguments contained in Bosworth's brief.
In reality, however,

First Equity determined only that

the broker could not enforce its contracts with the University, because those agreements were ultra vires.

Such a

ruling, in accord with settled law as to executory contracts,
is not applicable to executed contracts.

If anything, First

Equity requires this court to leave the parties where it
finds them and deny the University rescission of the executed
transactions.
The University implicitly acknowledges that it seeks
to extend the holding in First Equity by arguing at page 22
of its brief why such an extension should be made.

The
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University leads its series of cases purporting to establish
authority for such an extension with Miller v. McKinnon, 124
P.2d 34 (Cal. 1942), said to be authority that public monies
expended pursuant to unlawful contracts may be recovered.
In Miller

a taxpayer brought suit to recover monies paid to

a contractor by a county government, alleging violation of a
state competitive bidding statute.

The lower court's dis-

missal was reversed on appeal to the California Supreme Court,
which found that the taxpayer's Complaint stated a claim for
relief.

In

Mille~,

both the county and the contractor were

accused of violating a specific statute in effect throughout
the course of the parties' dealings.

The court held that

the contractor should be presumed to know the law with
respect to the requirement of competitive bidding, and that
such contractor acts at its peril when it fails to follow
specific statutory requirements.

Moreover, the taxpayer's

Complaint alleged that the contractor charged exorbitant
amounts for labor and materials.
Miller is inapposite to the case at bar, where no specifie statutory prohibition is involved.

In this case, not

only are there no facts which would allow a presumption that
Bosworth knew or should have known that the University's
transactions in securities were ~ltra ~ire~, but the authorization under which Catron acted is dispositive evidence to
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the contrary.

And in this case. there is no allegation that

Bosworth took any advantage of or acted wrongfully in its
dealings with the University.
Miller is also contrary to the Utah case of
Millard County School District
(1919).

~oe

v.

54 Utah 144, 179 Pac. 980

As discussed in Bosworth's main brief, the contrac-

tor in Moe entered into an agreement with the Millard County
School District to supply fixtures for a school building
The contract was declared void because it exceeded the constitutional debt limit.

While recognizing that the contrac-

tor could not recover money owing on an ultra vires contract,
(the First Equi_!y case) the court held that the contractor
should not be required to refund any of the purchase price
previously paid by the school district (this case).
The University also cites ?tate v. Axtell, 393 P.2d
451, 454 (N.M. 1964), calling it a leading case allowing
recovery under the rule that public bodies can recover monies
paid out under mistake of law.

That opinion, however, ac-

tually supports the position asserted here by Bosworth.
The

~xtel.1-_

opinion discusses the case of Tobin v. Town

Council, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666 (1933), which held that
the city of Sundance could not recover monies paid under an
illegal contract because the city had retained the benefits
it received

That same position is asserted by Bosworth
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here.

Axtell distinguished Tobin and other cases like Tobin

on the ground that Tobin was an action to recover monies
paid in good faith after services have been rendered and
could not be compared with the situation that existed in
AxteJl, which involved a gratuitous payment by the state to
a seller of feed furnished to farmers in an emergency.

The

court stated:
In any event, we would observe that the
cases relied upon by the appellees mainly involved attempts, under laws found to be unconstitutional, to recover monies paid in good
faith after the services had been rendered.
The cases mentioned are distinguishable and
cannot be compared with a situation in which
there is an outright gift.
393 P.2d at 456.
Therefore, Axtell supports

Bos~orth,

not the University.

The University further cites Gerzof v.

~weeney,

264 N.Y.S.

2d 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965), in support of its assertion that
it can somehow um1ind these executed transactions.

In Gerzof,

as in Miller, a contractor installed a generator for a city
in violation of the state competitive bidding law.

The court,

swayed by the fact that the very purpose of the bidding law
was to prohibit contractors from making unfair charges at the
expense and to the detriment of local taxpayers, held that
the generator was nonreturnable and that the contractor
should be required to pay the village the difference between
the price of the generator and a competitor's bid for a
smaller generator.

gerzof is no more on point than is

-6-
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addresses no legel issue relevant to the case at

bar, and affords no support for the University's position.
At page 30 of its brief, the University "string cites"
without comment 28 cases (none from this jurisdiction) which
the University states support its position.
Bosworth could "string cite" as many or more.

In an

A.L.R. annotation entitled "The Right of a Municipality or
Other Public Bos!Y..t or Taxpayer, to Recover Back Payments
Made Under Invalid or Unenforceable Contract," 140 A L.R.
583- there are over 50 cases supporting Bosworth's position
generally.

The annotation states:

Lack of any evidence of bad faith in the
execution of an invalid or unenforceable public
contract under which public funds have been expended, or lack of any evidence of collusion
between the contractor and the public authorities
in the execution of such contract, are occasionally relied on by the courts in sustaining their
refusal to permit recovery back of sums paid
under such contracts.
See, in this connection,
the following cases:
Sacramento County v.
Southern P. Co. (1899)127 Cal. 217, 59 P. 568,
825, set out infra, III a 2; Culver ex rel. Longyear v. Brown (1932) 259 Mich. 294, 243 N.W.~
set out infra, III b 4; ?illager v. Hewett (1906)
98 Minn. 265, 107 N.W. 815, set out infra, III a 3;
Witmer v. Nichols (1928) 320 Mo. 665, 8 S.W.2d. 63,
set out infra, III b
4; Schell City v. Rumsey
Mfg. Co. (189) (1890) 39 Mo. App. 264, set out
infra III a 3; ~zka v. Board of Education (1926)
126 Misc. 622, 214 N.Y.S. 264, set out infra,
III b 4; Bartron v. Codington County (S.D.)
(reported herewith) ante, 550: Tobin v. Sundance
(1933) 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666, 84 A.L.R. 902,
set out infra, III a 3.
140 A.L.R. at 588.
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In this case Bosworth made every reasonable effort to
obtain and did in fact obtain proof that the University had
authority to enter into the transactions before it acted as
the University's agent.

It has been neither alleged nor

shown that Bosworth acted in bad faith in discharge of its
agency obligation to the University, nor has it been alleged
or shown that Bosworth and the University have colluded to
the taxpayer's detriment.

POINT II
THE UNIVERSITY IS ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING
RECOVERY.
The University asserts that a government cannot be
estopped and, therefore, traditional estoppel principles
are inapplicable to this action.
It is clear as an initial matter that the traditional
elements of estoppel are present in this case.

The Univer-

sity officers and its Institutional Council were fully advised
of the University's investment program, the kinds of stocks
being purchased and sold, and the precise identity, cost and
sales price of every stock actually purchased and sold.

The

University intended that its conduct would be acted upon.
The University's corporate resolution had for its purpose to
allow the University to open and maintain an account with
Bosworth.

Bosworth was ignorant of the true facts, and
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relied to its detriment on the University's conduct.

There-

fore, unless estoppel principles do not apply to government
entities, the University is estopped from seeking restitution.
That this Court will apply equitable estoppel to governmental entities was recently reaffirmed in Celebrity Club,
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah
1979).

In Celebrity, the plaintiff wished to open a private

club where liquor would be sold and requested from the Liquor
Commission an opinion determining whether the premises at
which the club was to be situated would comply with Utah Code
Annotated, §16-6-13.5, which provides that such an establishment may not be located within 600 feet of a school.

The

Utah State Liquor Commission issued a letter to petitioner
advising him that the
ance with the statute.

locat~on

of the premises was in compli-

The plaintiff thereupon acted in

reliance upon that letter.

Sometime later, the Commission

advised the plaintiff that the sale of liquor on the premises
would be in violation of the statute and accordingly refused
to issue plaintiff a liquor license.

In a suit to compel

issuance of the license, this Court held that all the elements of estoppel had been made out and that the Commission
was estopped to deny the plaintiff a liquor license on the
grounds that it did not comply with the statute.
stated that those elements were:

-9-

The Court

(1) an admission, statement,
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or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted,

(2)

action by the other party on the faith of such admission,
statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such admission, statement, or act.

602 P.2d at 694.

The uncontroverted facts of this case, when applied to
the ruling of Celebrity Club, confirm that the University is
estopped as a matter of law.

The University issued a resolu-

tion affirming its authority to enter into purchase of common
stocks.

Such resolution is the admission, statement or act

designated in Celebrity Club.

Bosworth, the other party,

relied upon the resolution by acting as agent in the securities transactions for the University.

Bosworth stands to be

injured in the amount of over $1,000,000 if the University
is to be allowed to repudiate its specific representation.
Under the holding in Celebrity Club, a more compelling case
of estoppel than the uncontroverted facts in this case is
not readily imaginable.
The University's own case, Petty v. B0.£:1, 106 Utah 224,
150 P.2d 776 (1944) is inapplicable to this case.

In

~e!!_y,

the court found that the plaintiff's activities which were
claimed to have estopped the federal government were not
done for the government at all and that the plaintiff never
intended that his actions bind the government.

In this

-10-
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case, the Institutional Council did act on behalf of the
University and did intend to bind the University.
Finally, the University seems to assert that there is
some public policy reason for allowing a government entity
unilaterally to repudiate its agreements while retaining the
benefits thereof.
contrary.

The holding in Celebrity Club is to the

This court in Celebrity Club stated:

The conduct of government should always be
scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens;
and where a public official, acting within its
authority and with knowledge of the pertinent
facts, has made a commitment and the party to
whom it was made has acted to its detriment in
reliance on that commitment, officials should
not be permitted to revoke that commitment.
602
P.2d at 695.
The University has failed to demonstrate any reason
why this court should depar~ from the holding of Celebrity
Club.

The uncontroverted facts in this case present a clear

case for the application of estoppel principles.

Estoppel,

therefore, bars the University's claim.

POINT III
THE UNIVERSITY'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE
EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS.
The University states that Bosworth's defense of unclean
hands is inapplicable because eguitable relief is not sought.
Perhaps the University's difficulty in the characterization
of its claim stems froQ the unprecedented nature of the claim.

-11-
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Its confusion is manifestea by reliance upon a lengthy excerpt
from Gerzof for the proposition that its cause of action was
recognized at common law.

However, as the quoted passage

clearly indicates, the claim in Gerzof was based, not on the
common law, but upon a statute.

Moreover, the plaintiff's

own complaint, in its prayer for judgment, seeks restitution,
an equitable remedy, of the purchase price for securities
which have not been sold.
To the extent that the University seeks equitable relief,
Bosworth's defense of unclean hands is a bar.
A specific and uncontroverted instance of unclean hands
is the failure of the University to notify Bosworth after
December 15, 1972, when the University was alerted by the
Attorney General's office concerning a problem regarding
legality of the University's investments.

Most of Bosworth's

transactions for the University occurred between December
15, 1972 and March, 1973, when the University for the first
time notified Bosworth that the corporate resolution upon
which Bosworth relied was no longer in effect.
The University asserts that because of widespread publicity in Salt Lake City and Logan concerning the Attorney
General's opinion, Bosworth cannot complain of lack of notice.
The fact of the matter is, however, that the University officials who enacted the corporate resolution, knowing that

-12-
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that resolution was in effect until written notice was given
Bosworth to the contrary, failed to give such notice.

To

this date, the University has given no reason for the delay.
Further, the University, aware that its authority to
invest in common stocks was in question in December of 1972,
failed to notify Bosworth of such question until March of
1973.

The facts show that the University affirmatively and

wrongfully induced Bosworth to act to its detriment.

The

University has not done equity and, therefore, may not turn
to equity for relief.

POINT IV
VENUE IS IMPROPER IN CACHE COUNTY.
The University states that the specific venue provision applicable to this action is Utah Code Annotated,
§78-13-7, allowing actions not covered by other specific
venue statutes to be tried in the county in which the cause
of action arose.

All parties concur that the cause of

action arises where the wrong occurs.
The gist of the University's complaint is that Catron
exceeded his authority in purchasing and selling speculative
stock on behalf of the University, that the University
itself had no authorization to purchase or sell such stock,
that Bosworth was allegedly aware of the limitations of
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authority and power

(altho~g~

the

~nivers1ty

ne~er

exfla1ns

why Bosworth should have i:>een better able to anticipate the
Attorney General's opinion than the Vniversity itself), and
that the University suffered damages caused thereby.
Such a cause of action arose, if at all, in Salt
County.

La~e

The University's securities trading account with

Bosworth was opened in Bosworth's Salt Lake County office.
All orders for the purchase or sale of securities were
entered by the University at Bosworth's Salt Lake County
office.

All new accounts documents and authorizations by

the University were submitted to Bosworth's Salt Lake County
office.

Bosworth did nothing in Cache County.

However, the University states that the wrong occurred
in Cache County because the University illegally paid
out monies there.

This argument is indicative of the

difficulties encumbering the claim for relief.

The Uni-

versity apparently maintains, and states in its argument on
venue, that since the only wrong committed was the wrong committed by the University, that wrong had to have occurred in
Cache County.

Bosworth agrees with the University that the

acts, if any, committed in this case were committed by the
University.

What the University does not, and cannot,

explain is why its own wrongful acts affect venue as to the
named defendants.

The plaintiff University cannot lay venue

-14-
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under Utah Code Annotated, S78-13-7, nor any other statute,
until it can allege a wrongful act by someone other than
itself.
The University further argues that the its banks in
Cache County were agents of Bosworth, making venue proper in
Cache County.

For this proposition, the University relies

upon Utah Code Annotated, S70A-4-201(1) (1953), which provides
that a collecting bank is an agent or sub-agent of the owner
of an item prior to the time of settlement.

This statute,

Corr~ercial

Code, was never intended to

determine a venue question.

Nor can the banks in Logan

part of the Utah

be deemed

agents of Bosworth in the traditional, common law

sense, thus disposing of the venue question.
Finally, the University's claim that venue may be properly laid in each and every county in this state simply ignores the venue statutes and relevant case law.

POINT V
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAI~T FOR
INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION STATED CLAIMS
UPON WHICH RELIEF C~..N BE GRANTED.

BOS~ORTH'S

Bosworth's third-party claims are directed against
the University's officers and members of its Institutional
Council and are based on theories of implied contract,
warranty, implied warranty, misrepresentation, inderr.nity,
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subrogation and conduct outside the scope of authority.

The

court below granted the third-party defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.

In so doing, the lower court held as a matter

of law that under no conceivable state of facts could those
persons who actively implemented and supervised the University's investment program be required to indemnify Bosworth
against loss.
The third-party aefendants assert that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity shields the individuzl defendants because
public officials may not be held personally liable for acts
performed in good faith and within the scope of their duties.
What the third-party defendants overlook is that the University's claim against Bosworth is entirely predicated on the
theory that what these individuals did was entirely ultra
vires and thus not within the scope of their duties.

On the

University's theory of liability, as to which Bosworth seeks
indemnity, sovereign immunity affords no shelter to the individual third-party defendants.
In Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1128 (1936),
this Court, having stated the general rule that "a municipal
officer is immune from liability in a private suit for his
acts in the discharge of corporate duties in the absence of
willful negligence, malice, or corruption constituting mis-
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feasance,"

stated the corollary to that rule, making it

clear that a public officer "may not, however, claim immunity
for the commission of an act entirely outside the scope of
his official duties." 57 P.2d at 1131.

Thus, if the trans-

actions were, as the University asserts, ultra vires, the
individual defendants did not discharge a corporate duty,
but rather acted beyond their authority, power, or jurisdiction.

Under

Ro~,

therefore,

the individual defendants may

not claim sovereign immunity.
Similarly, in Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 87 Pac.
772 (1906), the court held that since the complaint did not
allege that, in performing their duties, the defendants
acted beyond the scope of their authority or that they acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction, a state sheep
inspector and others were not liable for their negligence in
quarantining plaintiff'& sheep.

The Third-Party Complaint of

Bosworth clearly states that, if it is liable to the University, it will be due to the fact that the individual thirdparty defendants acted without the scope of their authority
and jurisdiction and that such acts of the individual defendants were ultra vires.
There are numerous cases in accord with this proposition.
See Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 P.2d 1083 (1935)
(officers performing discretionary acts "may become civilly

-17-
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liable for the acts in excess of authority or where there is
a total want of jurisdiction,"); Hjorth v. Whittenberg, 121
Utah 324, 328, 241 P.2d 907 (1952)

(Utah State Road Commis-

sioners were entitled to immunity because they were exercising "duties imposed upon them and authorized by law"); Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971)
(if county officials were mistaken with respect to jurisdictional facts upon which they acted, then they could be
personally liable to plaintiff).
The cases cited by the individual third-party defendants also establish that sovereign immunity is of no aid
to them.

For example, in Anderson v. Granite School District,

17 Utah 2d 405, 413 P.2d 597 (1966), the court merely noted
the general rule that public officials are immune from damages for acts committed within the scope of their authority.
The court was not called upon to determine that the public
officials had committed acts totally without their power, as
the University claims in this case.
The third-party defendants' reliance upon Lister v.
Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976) is
also misplaced.

In Lister, four former University of

Wisconsin law students sought to recover the difference
between non-resident and resident tuition which they had
paid for two school years.

The named defendants were the
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University's System Board of Regents and the Registrar of
the University of Wisconsin.

The only "excess of authority"

asserted by the plaintiffs against the Registrar was his
alleged misinterpretation of the standard set forth in the
state statutes which governed the resident/non-resident
determination.

The court held that the Registrar could

properly assert official immunity in response to this claim
of a simple error in judgment in exercising his statutory
authority, as he was expressly empowered to make the resident
/non-resident decision.
Immediately following the text quoted by the third
party defendants in their brief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
went on to state that:
. • • there is no substantive liability
for damages resulting 'from mistakes and judgment
where the officer is specifically empowered to
exercise such judgment.
Since the University's theory of liability against Bosworth
is based upon the actions of the third party defendants,
actions as to which they were not specifically empowered to
exercise any kind of judgment, Lister affords them no
support.
Similarly misplaced is the third-party defendants'
reliance on McQuillan for the proposition that public
officials will not be held liable on contracts which they
execute.

Again, almost immediately following the passage
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quoted by the third-party defendants, McQuillan states that
"if public officers in making contracts go beyond or exceed
the authority given them, they may become personally liable."
4 McQuillan, 12.214, at 160.
The third party defendants, without whose resolution
Bosworth would never have conducted these transactions at
all, should not be allowed to invoke immunity to shield the
conduct in these cases.

POINT VI
BOSWORTH'S CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY STATES A
CLAIM FOR RELIEF.
The third-party individual defendants also claim that
Bosworth is barred from seeking indemnity because of active
participation in the events giving rise to liability.

How-

ever, the only claim in the University's Complaint upon which
Bosworth could be liable is that the University had no power
to enter into the transactions complained of.

Bosworth's

liability, if any, is tounded upon the legal status of the
University and upon Bosworth's alleged constructive knowledge
that the University's authority was not what the individual
defendants, all of them officers of the University, represented it to be.

Bosworth was not an active wrongdoer.

On the other hand, the allegations in Bosworth's ThirdParty Complaint, which must be taken as true for purposes of

-20-
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this appeal, are that the individual third-party defendants
passed a resolution authorizing Catron to purchase and sell
securities on behalf of the University and warranted in that
resolution that Catron had at all times "the authority in
every way to bind and obligate the University for the carrying out of any contract or transaction which shall, for and
in behalf of this corporation, be entered into or made with
or through the brokers."

Such resolution was a necessary

prerequisite to any transaction complained of herein.
The individual third-party defendants state that as the
broker played an essential role in the transactions giving
rise to liability and because there is no difference in the
culpability of the brokers and respondents sufficient to
justify the indemnity action, that action must be dismissed.
However, it is not the transactions which give rise to liability, it is the post-determined illegality thereof.

Moreover,

Bosworth has pleaded that there is in fact a difference
between its behavior and the enactment of a resolution,
through which Bosworth became involved in the first place,
and has stated facts to support its pleading.

There is a

significant difference between the brokers' and the respondents' culpability.

The Third-Party Complaint is sufficient

to withstand a Motion to Dismiss.

-21-
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bosworth respectfully requests this Court to reverse the ruling of the court below,
and to direct the District Court to enter judgment in favor
of Bosworth on its Motion to Dismiss.
In the alternative, Bosworth requests this Court to
reverse the rulings of the court below granting the University's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Bosworth's
Third-Party Complaint against the individual defendants, and
in denying Bosworth's Motion for Change of Venue and to
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with
this court's opinion.
Respectfully submitted,

By~~Jff-----Attorneys for Appellant
Bosworth, Sullivan et al.
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
521-9000
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STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
NORMA F. CROSSLEY, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen
and Martineau, Attorneys for Appellant Bosworth, Sullivan
and Company herein; that she served the attached Reply Brief
of Appellant Bosworth, Sullivan and Company, Case No. 16274,
upon the following persons by placing two true and correct
copies thereof in an envelope addressed as follows:
David L. Wilkinson
Office of the Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Darwin C. Hansen
506 South Main
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Robert S. Campbell, Jr.
Michael Heyrend
310 South Main Street, 12~h Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Keith Taylor
Daniel Allred
79 South State Street
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah

and mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the

11 7 H

day of

April, 1980.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

_j_J_

day of

Apr i 1 , 1 9 8 0 .

My Commissio£xpires:
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